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GENERAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS - A CRITIQUE
OF THE MARYLAND LAW
BERNARD AUERBACH*
"It is traditional that statutes are unreadable, indefinite,
confusing and misleading." - 1A.J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Ch. 21, § 21.05 (1972).
"The laws ought not to be subtle. They are designed for people of
common understanding." - C. MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS, BOOK XXIX, Ch. XIV (Aldine Ed., 1900).
This article evaluates Maryland legislation regarding judicial
jurisdiction over claims having no relation to the state, and seeks to
determine which of the above commentaries better describes Maryland
law. From an appraisal of Maryland's statutory evolution and the
impact of Supreme Court case law, it appears that Sutherland's
observations are more applicable.
There are two basic species of jurisdiction that have developed in
American practice. This article distinguishes between these two
varieties of jurisdiction by reference to the terminology suggested by
Von Mehren and Trautman.1 The term "general" jurisdiction refers to
the assertion of a state's authority to decide any controversy on the
basis of a relationship between the forum and the parties. Under
"tgeneral" jurisdiction, this power is extended irrespective of whether the
controversy relates to the state. The second form of a state's adjudica-
tory power, "specific" jurisdiction, is predicated upon a nexus between
the forum and a particular controversy. Where a state is accorded
"specific" jurisdiction, the power to adjudicate is limited to claims
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1945, Yeshiva
University; J.D., 1950, New York University; L.L.M. 1959, Yale University.
1. A. Von Mehren and D. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
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arising out of the specific controversy.2 This article encompasses an
appraisal of "general" jurisdiction; i.e., the assertion of the power to
adjudicate any claim between the parties despite the claim's having no
relation to the state.
The statute that asserts Maryland's general jurisdiction has been
amended twice - once in 1971 and again in 1973. The original statute,
modeled on the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act3
was adopted in 1964.
I. THE 1964 STATUTE
A. The Separate Treatment of General and
Specific Jurisdiction
The statute enacted in 1964 separated the distinct classes of
jurisdiction into two sections. The first section, § 95 of Article 75,
provided for general jurisdiction: "A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or
maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this state as to any
cause of action."4 This provision asserted jurisdiction over unrelated
claims. The second section, § 96 of Article 75, enumerated various acts
of the defendant in or affecting the state which furnished a qualified
2. Although the specific terminology may differ in the treatment of the subject, the
distinction between the two types of jurisdiction is basic for proper analysis. For example,
according to Weintraub, "it will be useful to keep in mind the distinction between
generally-affiliating contacts and specifically-affiliating contacts;" the former providing
the basis for jurisdiction over a defendant as to any cause of action, and the latter only as
to a cause of action that is related to the contact. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 132 (2d ed. 1980). Vernon distinguishes between the "broad"
jurisdiction of courts in adjudicating claims unrelated to the forum, based on a "single"
factor connecting the defendant with the state; and "limited" jurisdiction based on a
"multiple-factor" foundation stemming from a defendant's acts in the forum state or
affecting that state. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction - A
Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 276 Ihereinafter
cited as Vernon]. It would seem, however, that the distinction is not so much the
"singleness" or "multiplicity" of the factors but rather whether they relate to the
controversy or to the defendant.
3. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as
Uniform Act] was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August, 1962, and was approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association in February, 1963. The Uniform Act and the Commissioner's Comments
are now contained in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 459 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM
LAWS].
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 95 (1964). As part of the revision of the Code in 1973,
this section was enacted as § 6-102(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
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basis for jurisdiction.5 Section 96 restricted the state's jurisdiction to
suits arising out of specifically enumerated conduct of the defendant.
Jurisdiction over a controversy unrelated to the state was covered only
in the general jurisdiction section.
A statute's disparate treatment of the two forms of jurisdiction
promotes a clear understanding of their differences. It facilitates the
analysis of issues which are settled according to the variety of
jurisdiction involved. One issue, for example, entails the time at which
the jurisdictional fact must exist. It is clear that specific jurisdiction is
based on events which took place in the past and usually have ended
before the action was instituted. In contrast, assume that general
jurisdiction over an unrelated claim is asserted on the basis of facts
which, although previously existing, are no longer true at the time of
suit (for example, in an automobile accident that occurred outside the
state, the defendant formerly was domiciled in the state but since has
moved away). Here, as distinguished from specific jurisdiction, it is
generally held that the general jurisdictional basis must exist at the
time of suit.6 The only basis for this jurisdiction is the connection
between the defendant and the state; if such connection has ceased, so
has the jurisdictional foundation. 7
5. Article 75, § 96, as originally enacted, reads as follows:
(a) A Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(1) Transacting any business in this State;
(2) Contracting to supply services in this State;
(3) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission in this State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside the
State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent
course of conduct in this State or derives substantial revenue from food or services
used or consumed in this State;
(5) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State; or
(6) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk, located within this
State at the time of contracting.
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96 (1964). In 1973, the subject matter of the section was placed in
§ 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. For discussion of the statute as
originally passed, see Auerbach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. REV. 13
(1966).
6. Lucini v. Mayhew, 113 R.I. 641, 647, 324 A.2d 663, 666 (1974). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 (1971) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT); WEINTRAUB,
supra note 2, at 183-85.
7. The Commissioner's Comment to the general jurisdiction section of the Uniform
Act justifies the wide range of jurisdiction upon "the defendant's enduring relationship or
continuing contact with the state." UNIFORM LAWS, supra note 3, at 464 (Commissioner's
Comment).
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B. Matters Not Covered by the Statute
1. Method of Giving Notice
The 1964 statute governed only that component of jurisdiction
which concerned the state's assertion of its adjudicatory authority. The
statute did not regulate the second element of jurisdiction, the method
of providing proper notice to the defendant. Instead, the means for
giving proper notice is to be prescribed by the Maryland Rules of
Procedure. 8
2. Physical Presence as a Basis for Jurisdiction
The presence of an individual within the state was not included in
the 1964 statute as a basis for the assertion of general jurisdiction (i.e.,
jurisdiction over an unrelated claim). The traditional basis for jurisdic-
tion at common law was one's permanent or temporary presence in the
state; the only recognized means of giving notice under the common law
was personal service.9 It was thought, therefore, that it was unneces-
sary to incorporate this element into the statute. All other bases of
jurisdiction, however, required a statutory provision.
C. The "Principal Place of Business" Formula
for General Jurisdiction
Under the statute, general jurisdiction also arises from the state's
authority to resolve an unrelated claim based upon a non-resident
individual or a foreign corporation locating its principal place of
business in the state. As the Commissioner's Comment to the Uniform
Act notes, this is an expansion of the jurisdiction which most states
formerly had exercised over individuals.' ° This formulation, however,
limits the jurisdiction many states previously had asserted over foreign
8. The Maryland statute makes this explicit. It provides: "In addition to any method
allowed by law, service of process may be made in accordance with the Maryland Rules or
the Maryland District Rules." MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-301. Md. R. Civ. P.
107 (Service of Process Outside the State) was promulgated pursuant to this provision
following the passage of the long-arm statute.
9. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 28a. Consent to jurisdiction by the defendant,
or appearance in an action, were also recognized at common law, but in these instances
the submission to jurisdiction was a voluntary one. Id. at §§ 32-33.
10. See UNIFORM LAWS, supra note 3, at 464. Prior to the enactment of long-arm
statutes, general jurisdiction over individuals was asserted on the basis of physical
presence, domicile, consent or appearance.
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corporations when the basis for jurisdiction was the corporation's "doing
business" in the state.1 '
The Supreme Court established the standard for general jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.12 The standard was not particularly precise. The business
done must be "sufficiently substantial and of such a nature" as to permit
jurisdiction over an unrelated claim. 3 The Restatement of Conflicts
defines the standard as whether the "business is so continuous and
substantial as to make it reasonable for the state to exercise such
jurisdiction." 4
In Perkins, a foreign corporation had its principal place of business
in the forum state. This is not to imply that the exercise of general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation necessarily is rendered invalid
because the corporation does not have its principal place of business in
the state. The business done may be sufficient in continuity and extent
to make the jurisdiction proper. But, if the activity is characterized as
"ordinary" or "usual," the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated
claim may be improper. The application of these generalized standards
is not an easy one. It is clear, however, that general jurisdiction on the
basis of the "doing business" standard, would, in many cases, violate the
"fair play" and "substantial justice" principles which International Shoe
Co. v. Washington'5 established as the foundation for proper
jurisdiction. 16 In those situations, the defendant's activities in the forum
are not sufficient to require the defendant, as a matter of equity, to
11. Whatever the exact dimensions of "principal place of business" and "doing
business," it is clear that the former requires a much greater association with the state
than the latter.
12. 342 U.S. 437, reh. denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952).
13. Id. at 447.
14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 35(3) (individuals), § 47(2) (corporations). Von
Mehren and Trautman object to the RESTATEMENT formulation to the extent that it may
imply that "doing business" in a state by a defendant is sufficient for general jurisdiction.
What is necessary is a "total, close, and continuing" relationship to a community, such as
the location of a head office within a state. Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 1, at
1144.
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court stated this conclusion as follows:
Although a foreign corporation may have sufficient contacts with a state to justify an
assumption of jurisdiction over it to enforce causes of action having no relation to its
activities in that state . . . more contacts are required for the assumption of such
extensive jurisdiction than sales and sales promotion within the state by independent
non-exclusive sales representatives.
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 3 (1959).
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appear in an action unrelated to its forum activities." 7 Exercising
caution, the Uniform Act adopted the stricter "principal place of
business" standard for general jurisdiction and greatly expanded the
instances of specific jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The 1964
Maryland statute did the same.
II. THE 1971 AMENDMENT
In 1971, Article 75 § 96(a)(4), the predecessor to § 6-103(b)(4) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, was amended to assert
jurisdiction over actions involving tortious injuries outside of the state.
Prior to this amendment the subsection provided for jurisdiction as to a
cause of action arising from a person's "[clausing tortious injury in this
State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or
solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in
this State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services or
manufactured products used or consumed in this State.' The amend-
ment added the phrase "or outside of this State," so that the first part of
the subsection now reads "[c]ausing tortious injury in this State or
outside of this State by an act or omission outside the State.' 9
17. Examples of situations where sufficient contacts with the forum arguably existed
to constitute the doing of business but where general jurisdiction over the defendant was
denied are: maintenance by a Phillipine banking corporation of deposits in the six local
banks for processing letters of credit and facilitating the transfer of funds between the
forum state and the home country of the defendant, H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated
Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); mail solicitation
and mailing of promotional literature to about 650 forum doctors by a foreign drug
manufacturer, Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 948 (1971); advertising by mail and visits by about a half-dozen salesmen to
potential customers for solicitation of business, Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d
584 (1st Cir. 1970); the hauling of freight into the forum state approximately twenty times
per year for about seven years prior to an out-of-state accident, Cornelison v. Chaney, 16
Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264 (1976); the leasing of two offices in the state by a foreign
railroad for the purpose of soliciting freight traffic, Wainscott v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 133, 351 N.E.2d 466 (1976).
There is a greater tendency to find that sufficient contacts exist for jurisdiction
over an unrelated claim where the plaintiff is a local resident. See, e.g., Carter v. Massey,
436 F. Supp. 29 (D. Md. 1977).
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1970). The reference to goods and
manufactured products as a source of revenue derived in the state was not contained in
the original statute, but was added in 1970. See the original enactment of Article 75, § 96
in its entirety, supra note 5.
19. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103(b)(4) (1980).
[VOL. 40
GENERAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS
A. The Introduction of General Jurisdiction Into the
Specific Jurisdiction Section
Section 6-103 is intended to govern "specific" jurisdiction, i.e.,
claims arising out of events which connect the case to the forum.2" Here,
too, the 1964 statute followed the Uniform Act. In subsection (b)(4) the
event that connected the case to the forum was the injury out of which
the claim arose which occurred in the state. The defendant's conduct
which caused the injury took place outside the state. The business
conducted or revenue earned by the defendant in the state did not have
to relate to the specific events connected with the injury.
The justification for adopting this formula requires some explana-
tion. The legislature contemplated a typical products liability case in
which a local consumer is injured in the state by a product manufac-
tured elsewhere by the defendant. The jurisdictional problem that
emerged was connecting the defendant, which played no part in
bringing the product into the state, with the forum. In Hanson v.
Denckla,2' the Supreme Court established the requirement that the
defendant's act must be one "by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws., 22
The Illinois Supreme Court responded to this problem in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.23 The Illinois court
concluded that by placing the product into the stream of commerce with
the reasonable expectation that the product would find its way into the
forum state, the defendarit had sufficiently connected itself with that
state. It was not until 1980 that the United States Supreme Court
indicated approval of the "stream of commerce" rationale. 24 Prior to that
20. See notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text supra.
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
22. Id. at 253 (citing with approval International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 319 (1945)).
23. 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The illinois statute based jurisdiction upon
the commission of a tortious act within the state. The court held that a tort is "committed"
in the jurisdiction where the last event necessary to create liability occurs. Id. at 435, 176
N.E.2d at 762.
24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). "[f the sale of a
product . . . arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to
suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source
of injury to its owner or to others." Id. at 297.
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time, however, many cases rejected this "stream of commerce" notion.2 5
The Uniform Commissioners similarly were unconvinced by the
concept. 26 The Uniform Act, therefore, additionally required some
overall connection between the defendant and the forum. The connec-
tion did not have to be a "substantial" one, nor was it necessary for the
activity to amount to the "doing of business."
The 1971 amendment effectively removed the requirement of injury
in the state. As a result, the claim of jurisdiction is no longer for
"specific," but rather for "general" jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is now
asserted over a claim not related to the state on the basis of a
connection between the state and the defendant. The legislature could
have accomplished the same result by simply deleting the words "in this
State" in reference to the place of injury.
B. The Problems Produced by the 1971 Amendment
1. Statutory Problems
Although the legislature incorporated the subject matter of § 6-102,
which governs general jurisdiction, into § 6-103, which governs specific
jurisdiction, no change was made in the general structure of either
provision. Section 6-102 still required that, in order for a defendant to
be subject to suit on an unrelated claim in Maryland, the defendant's
Rrincipal place of business must be within the state. Section 6-103(a)
retained its requirement that the cause of action must arise from
conduct specifically enumerated in that section. Subsection (4),
however, refers to two separate acts by the defendant: first, the
defendant's conduct outside the state producing the plaintiff's injury;
and second, the defendant's overall activity (or revenue earned) within
25. A good example of the reasoning of such cases is contained in Hutson v. Fehr
Bros. Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978). The court there held that the sale of a product by a
manufacturer to a supplier or wholesaler who in turn introduces the product into a state is
too "frail" a foundation for jurisdiction over the manufacturer in that state. The control
over marketing decisions relating to the product is in the hand of the supplier, not the
manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer "did not consciously solicit or purposefully avail
itself of the privilege to conduct business in the forum state .. " Id. at 837.
26. The Commissioner's Comment to § 1.03 of the Uniform Act notes that its rule is
more restrictive than that of the Gray case. It explains that "[iun sustaining the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant who has caused injury in the state by means of a tortious act
done outside the state, the courts have often emphasized that the defendant had contacts
with the state that bore no relation to the particular tort." UNIFORM LAws, supra note 3, at
468-69.
27. In 1973, this requirement was placed in subsection 6-103(a) which reads: "If
jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause
of action arising from any act enumerated in this section." § 6-103(b) enumerates those
acts. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103 with MD. ANN. CODE art. 75,
§ 96.
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the state and unconnected with the injury. If the act enumerated gives
rise to the claim, but does not provide a basis for jurisdiction, the
question that emerges is whether the "arising from" requirement has
been satisfied. In a suit involving an out-of-state injury, the resolution
of this inquiry will determine the existence of jurisdiction. The claim
does not arise out of a jurisdiction-producing fact (i.e., general conduct
within the state), but rather the claim arises out of a non-jurisdiction-
producing fact (i.e., act and injury outside of the state). Therefore, if
§ 6-103(b) is interpreted to require that the cause of action arise from
the act which is the basis for jurisdiction over the defendant, it cannot
be satisfied.
2. Constitutional Problems
A second issue is the amendment's constitutional validity. As noted
above, jurisdiction is asserted over an unrelated claim based on the
defendant's conduct in the state, which need not even amount to the
"doing of business." Many situations covered by the amendment
undoubtedly will not reach the level of being "sufficiently substantial
and of such a nature" as to permit general jurisdiction over the
defendant.28 It is clear that deriving revenue from the state without any
actual conduct by the defendant will not support general jurisdiction.2 9
A serious question of constitutional validity, therefore, will arise in
many circumstances in which the amendment applies.
The "principal place of business" formula of § 6-102 may have been
too strict. The 1971 amendment, however, makes no change in this
standard, but instead introduces a different formula into § 6-103(b)(4)
so that both exist simultaneously. The result is that in the case of a
tortious injury unrelated to the state, the jurisdictional standard is
broadened considerably, perhaps beyond constitutional limits. For all
other causes of action, the overly restrictive original standard remains
undisturbed.
28. See generally cases cited in note 17 supra.
29. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the
Oklahoma court asserted jurisdiction in a case arising out of an Oklahoma automobile
accident, over the New York automobile dealer who sold the car, and over the wholesale
distributor. One of the arguments for jurisdiction was that the defendant derived
substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are used in Oklahoma. The
Court rejected this argument, stating that "financial benefits accruing to the defendant
from a collateral relation to the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not
stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State." Id. at 299. Note that the
Court rejected the "revenue" basis for jurisdiction even where the accident occurred in the
forum state.
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C. The Response of the Federal District Court
In 1973, Judge Frank A. Kaufman of the United States District
Court for Maryland confronted these questions in Egeria, Societa di
Navigazione Per Azioni v. Orinoco Mining Co. 30 The plaintiff sued for
damage to its freighter occurring in Venezuela, and claimed that the
defendant negligently maintained the ship channel and negligently
cleared the ship for passage. The defendant, in addition to operating a
Venezuelan ship channel, mined iron ore. Judge Kaufman found that
there was at least a significant question as to whether the defendant
derived substantial revenue from the use of its iron ore in Maryland, as
required by § 6-103(b)(4). Before proceeding to that factual inquiry,
however, the court determined whether the statute was satisfied even if
the defendant had earned substantial revenue in the state.
The question presented was whether the cause of action arose from
an act enumerated in subsection (b)(4) as required by subsection (a).
Judge Kaufman answered in the negative. He reasoned that the purpose
of subsection (a) is to prevent the assertion of claims under § 6-103
"that do not bear some relationship to the acts in the forum state relied
upon to confer jurisdiction., 3 1 In other words, the purpose of subsection
(a) is to classify the subject matter of § 6-103 under specific jurisdiction
and not general jurisdiction. Because the "act enumerated" is the
derivation of revenue in the state, and because none of the elements of
the alleged negligence of the defendant were in any way connected with
the defendant's derivation of revenue in Maryland, the court held that
subsection (a) of the statute had not been satisfied. As a result of this
holding based upon the facts in the case, it was unnecessary to address
the constitutionality of an assertion of jurisdiction.
D. The Response of the Maryland Court of Appeals
When the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1976 faced the same
questions in Geelhoed v. Jensen,32 its answers differed. The plaintiff in
Geelhoed sued for criminal conversation which allegedly occurred in
Montreal, Canada in March, 197 1.33 The plaintiff and his wife were
domiciled in Maryland. Although the defendant was a domiciliary of
30. 360 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1973).
31. Id. at 1005, quoting Malinow v. Eberly, 322 F. Supp. 594, 599 (D. Md. 1971).
32. 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976).
33. Id. at 222, 352 A.2d at 820. In Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980),
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the common law action for criminal conversation
violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the
action was available to men but not to women.
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California, he had been a full-time resident of Maryland while fulfilling
his Selective Service obligation between 1969 and June, 1971.
The court first established that the requirements of subsection
(b)(4) were satisfied: the defendant's act was outside the state; it was
immaterial where the injury occurred; and the defendant was engaged
in a persistent course of conduct in the state, having been a full-time
resident for two years.
The court next examined § 6-103(a)'s requirement that the cause of
action must arise from one of the acts enumerated in subsection (b). The
resolution necessarily was contingent upon which act enumerated in
subsection (b)(4) was the one referred to by subsection (a): was it the act
causing the injury or the persistent conduct in the state (i.e., the
residence of the defendant in Maryland). If found to be the latter, there
could be no jurisdiction.
The full text of the court's conclusion follows:
The reference to "act enumerated in this section" with respect to
subsection (b)(4) refers only to the act or omission which causes
tortious injury; to hold otherwise would be to impose a limitation
not required by due process. Furthermore, subsection (b)(4) would
add little or nothing to the statute if it were held that the cause of
action must arise out of the defendant's doing or soliciting business,
engaging in any other persistent course of conduct or deriving
substantial revenue from activities in the State. Such action would
be provided for in other sections of § 6-103.34
This conclusion is based on the argument that the legislature, in
amending subsection (b)(4), impliedly changed the basic thrust of
subsection (a), which was to establish that § 6-103 covered only
"specific" jurisdiction. A continued adherence to that interpretation
would have rendered the 1971 amendment a nullity since jurisdiction
over an unrelated claim (injury outside the state caused by an act
outside the state) based on an overall relationship of the defendant to
the state (e.g., full-time residence) cannot satisfy a requirement that the
cause of action arise out of the acts which are the basis for jurisdiction.35
As the court noted, if the claim arises out of the defendant's conduct
in the state, one or more of the other subsections of § 6-103(b) would be
applicable. As to those subsections, the original purpose of subsection (a)
- to limit the assertion of jurisdiction to claims related to the state -
34. 277 Md. at 232, 352 A.2d at 825-26.
35. For a similar analysis and conclusion, see Carter v. Massey, 436 F. Supp. 29, 32
(D. Md. 1977).
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retains its validity. Since the Geelhoed case, however, this analysis no
longer applies to subsection (b)(4).36 Subsection (a) effectively limits the
assertion under subsection (b)(4) of jurisdiction over an unrelated claim
to cases arising from tortious injury only. Nonetheless, even for this
purpose, the limitation of subsection (a) is probably unnecessary in view
of the specific reference in subsection (b)(4) to tortious injury.
By arguing that a contrary interpretation of subsection (a) would
impose a limitation not required by due process, the Geelhoed court
reasoned that due process permits general jurisdiction, and that the
1971 amendment provides for general jurisdiction; therefore due process
does not require an interpretation of subsection (a) that prevents the
amendment from being effective. It should be noted however, that, as
stated above, many cases satisfying the requirement of subsection (b)(4)
would be skating on constitutional thin ice.37
A curious issue emerges toward the conclusion of the Geelhoed
opinion. The defendant argued that he had moved out of Maryland prior
to the commencement of the action, and that general jurisdiction
requires the relation to the forum state to exist at the time the
authority of the state is to be exercised, i.e., when suit is commenced.38
The court's response to that argument did not dispute its validity. It
noted that although the tortious act occurred outside the state, it "bore a
substantial relationship to the State., 39 The plaintiff was domiciled in
the state which was the situs of the marital relationship. The injury,
therefore, took place in the state. For these reasons, the fact that the
defendant moved out of the state did not remove the state's interest in
the dispute.
According to this analysis, the Geelhoed case actually represents an
assertion of specific jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction because
the claim itself is related to the state. The cause of action does arise out
of the event which provides the basis for jurisdiction, namely, the act of
the defendant causing consequences in the state. The implication of the
court's response is that in the case of a truly unrelated claim, where the
act and the injury both occur out of the state, the defendant's
relationship to the state which provides the basis for jurisdiction must
exist at the time of the commencement of the action - a requirement
not applicable to the other subsections of § 6-103(b).
36. Prior to the 1971 amendment the "act enumerated" in subsection (4) was the
defendant's act causing injury in the state out of which the claim arose, which provided an
essential element for the jurisdiction over the defendant.
37. See notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text supra.
38. See notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text supra.
39. 277 Md. at 233, 352 A.2d at 826.
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E. Section 6-102: The Appropriate Place for the Expansion
of General Jurisdiction
The aim of the 1971 amendment was to expand general jurisdiction.
The appropriate place for statutory change, however, was § 6-102,
which concerns general jurisdiction, and not § 6-103, which covers
specific jurisdiction. The "principal place of business" standard could
have been replaced by a more inclusive formula which would have been
applicable to all cases and not just to tortious injuries. It is difficult to
understand why a Maryland plaintiff having a contract claim, for
example, should not enjoy the same opportunity to sue in a local court
as a Maryland plaintiff having a tortious injury claim. Had this
approach been adopted, the problem of interpreting § 6-103(a) after the
amendment would have been avoided.
The original text of subsection (b)(4) reflected a careful considera-
tion of the constitutional permissibility of asserting jurisdiction based
upon a combination of injury in the state and some minimal general
contact of the defendant with the state. The amendment deleted the
requirement of injury in the state, yet made no change in the standards
for the defendant's relationship to the state. Therefore, the constitution-
al underpinning for the exercise of the asserted jurisdiction has been
seriously weakened. Had a more precise standard, specifically applic-
able to all cases of general jurisdiction, been the subject of an
amendment to § 6-102, the constitutional infirmity would have been
vitiated.
III. THE 1973 AMENDMENT
In 1973, the Maryland legislature amended § 6-102(a) by adding
four words. Prior to that time the section provided: "A court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized
under the laws of or maintaining his or its principal place of business in
this state as to any cause of action." The amendment added the words
"served with process in" following the reference to domicile. This
amendment was included in the new Courts & Judicial Proceedings
Article promulgated at that time as part of the recodification of the
Maryland Code.
The original text was the same as the Uniform Act. The Commis-
sioner's Comment to the applicable section of the Uniform Act stated
that the section establishes the basis for personal jurisdiction over a
person who is outside the state as to any cause of action.4 ° Jurisdiction
40. Commissioner's Comment to § 1.02 of the Uniform Act, UNIFORM LAWS, supra note
3, at 464.
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is justified by the defendant's enduring relationship or continuing
contact with the state.4 ' Prior to 1973 the Maryland courts invoked the
common law rule and asserted jurisdiction over individuals served with
process in the state as to any cause of action.4 2 The 1973 amendment
made this assertion of jurisdiction a statutory one.
A. The Application of the 1973 Amendment by
the Court of Special Appeals to
Foreign Corporations
In 1978 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals considered the 1973
amendment in Springle v. Cottrell Engineering Corp.43 The case
involved a North Carolina resident who was injured in North Carolina
while serving aboard the defendant's dredge as a seaman. The action
against the owner of the dredge was based upon its failure to provide
the plaintiff with maintenance and care. The defendant was incorpo-
rated in Delaware and had its principal office in Virginia. None of the
defendant's acts involved in the case occurred in Maryland. The
defendant, after qualifying to do business in Maryland in 1964,
appointed and maintained a resident agent in Maryland to accept
service on its behalf. In this case, process was served on the resident
agent. The court concluded that "service of process, in Maryland, upon a
resident agent appointed by a foreign corporation will subject the
corporation to State court jurisdiction if, in addition to the fact, and
validity, of that service, it is shown that the corporation has sufficient
contact with the State to make it constitutionally subject to suit here.",44
There must be a statutory source for the assertion of any
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, because there is no common law
rule for jurisdiction over such corporations, as there is for individuals.
There is serious doubt that the intent of the 1973 amendment was to
assert a new basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations by means of
service of process on an agent in the state. The Revisor's Note to
§ 6-102(a) states that the new section "presently appears" as Article 75,
§ 95 (the Prior code provision). It then explains that the new section
"states the general rule that a state has jurisdiction over its residents
and over non-residents served with process in the state as to any cause
of action wherever it arose." The reference to "residents" and "non-
residents" would cover only natural persons. It would seem that in the
41. Id.
42. See note 9 supra.
43. 40 Md. App. 267, 391 A.2d 456 (1978).
44. Id. at 288, 391 A.2d at 469.
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interests of completeness the new Courts Article was drafted to include
the common law rule as to jurisdiction over individuals based on
physical presence in the state.
The United States Supreme Court has laid down the principle that
service on an officer or an agent of a foreign corporation in a state is in
itself insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the corporation if it is not
otherwise subject to the state's jurisdiction. This holds true even if the
agent is in the state on corporate business.45 The business conducted in
the state may be a proper basis for jurisdiction, but the service of
process per se is not.
Service of process on an agent of a corporation therefore performs
only the function of notice-giving. As such, it is the proper subject of the
Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure and not the Maryland Code, which
concerns itself only with the basis of authority over a defendant. 46 The
basis of authority over a corporation is its activities in, or relationship
with, the state. The reference to service of process in the statute can
therefore only refer to natural persons where at common law such
service performed a dual function - the assertion of authority and the
giving of notice.
B. Consent as a Possible Basis for Jurisdiction Over
a Foreign Corporation Whose Agent
is Served in the State
An argument for applying the service of process provision to foreign
corporations may be made as follows: A state has the power to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has authorized an agent to
accept service of process in the state, as to all causes of action to which
the authority of the agent extends.47 By appointing the agent, the
corporation may be regarded as consenting to jurisdiction over it as to
all causes of action. Thus, general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
can be accomplished by serving the agent with process in the state.
Even according to this argument, the basis of authority is not the
service of process but the prior consent of the corporation. Section
45. Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933); Goldey v. Morning
News, 156 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1895).
46. The Maryland Rules provide for service of process upon a "resident agent or upon
the president, secretary or treasurer [of a corporation]." Md. R. Civ. P. 106(b)(1).
Federal Rule 4(d)(3) provides for jurisdiction over a corporation by means of
service on an agent appointed to receive service of process. Both the Maryland and the
Federal Rules, therefore, provide the mechanism for bringing notice of the action to the
attention of the defendant corporation.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 44.
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6-102(a) does not refer to consent as a basis for jurisdiction. In any case,
§ 7-210 of the Corporations and Associations Article provides that
qualification by a foreign corporation to do business in the state (which
includes the designation of a resident agent) will not in and of itself
render the corporation subject to suit in the state, nor will it be
considered as consent by it to be sued.4 s
C. The Constitutional and Statutory Problems Arising From
the Application of the Service of Process Clause
of § 6-102 to Foreign Corporations
The court in Springle held that § 6-103(b) determines whether a
corporation whose resident agent is served in the state has sufficient
contact with the state to make it constitutionally subject to suit.49 These
subsections say it is constitutionally permissible to sue on a related
claim under these circumstances. Springle extends these criteria to
unrelated claims, and validates the jurisdiction if any one of the criteria
contained in that section is satisfied.5 0 Thus two distinct standards for
general jurisdiction over foreign corporations will exist simultaneously
- one for corporations that have appointed an agent and another for
corporations that have not appointed an agent. For those corporations
that have not appointed a resident agent, general jurisdiction will be
governed by the "principal place of business" standard of § 6-102(a).
The rationale for the distinction is not easily ascertainable. On the
contrary, why should a foreign corporation failing to appoint an agent,
contrary to law, be less subject to local jurisdiction than one conforming
to its obligations?
48. MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 7-210. This provision originally was enacted in
1941. 1941 Md. Laws art. 23, § 120(a). For the background of this enactment, see the
discussion in the Springle case, 40 Md. App. at 278-79, 391 A.2d at 463-65.
49. Id. at 288, 391 A.2d at 469.
50. Although the court refers to all the criteria contained in § 6-103(b), only those
stated in subsection (4) conceivably could provide a basis for general jurisdiction over an
unrelated claim. The other subsections refer either to single transactions or to the
ownership of property. A single transaction in a state cannot be the basis for jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation on an unrelated claim. International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Neither can the ownership of property. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 209 (1977). As a matter of statutory interpretation the court concluded that "the
effect of reading §§ 6-102 and 6-103 together is to make inapplicable the requirement of
§ 6-103(a) that the cause of action arise from an act enumerated in § 6-103(b), since
jurisdiction would not be based 'solely upon [that] section'. " 40 Md. App. at 288 n.18, 391
A.2d at 469 n.18. But constitutional limitations still remain. The practical effect of
Springle, therefore, is to permit jurisdiction on the basis of the criteria of subsection (4)
even for non-tortious injury claims if service is made on the foreign corporation's resident
agent in the state.
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One might also ask a further question: if the corporation has
engaged in sufficient activities in the state to subject it to jurisdiction on
an unrelated claim, why distinguish between service of process in the
state and outside the state? Either is sufficient for notice-giving purposes.
The pattern that results is the following: if the corporation has its
principal place of business in the state, service can be made either in the
state or outside the state.5 If the corporation does not have its principal
place of business in the state, but engages in sufficient activity in the
state to subject it to suit on an unrelated claim, it is subject to
jurisdiction only if a resident agent is served in the state.5 2 The
corporation, however, cannot be served outside the state. However, this
is not true concerning claims for tortious injury outside the state
because § 6-103(b)(4) becomes directly applicable and service can be
made either in or outside the state.
53
The Springle court's reference to the criteria contained in § 6-
103(b) as the standards for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation whose
resident agent has been served in the state is buttressed by the
argument that if these standards are sufficient for a non-qualifying
corporation, upon less than "personal" service, then surely they are
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a qualifying corporation whose
resident agent is served in the state. But whether or not a corporation
formally qualifies to do business in the state is irrelevant to the
question of jurisdiction, except for the argument of consent, which the
legislature has rejected.54 It is what the corporation actually does that is
the deciding factor.
Once again, as with the 1971 amendment to § 6-103(b)(4), criteria
originally intended for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a related
claim are being used as standards for the assertion of general
jurisdiction over an unrelated claim. Aside from the inherent constitu-
tional problem involved, as discussed above,55 there is an added element
51. Service in the state would be made pursuant to Md. R. Civ. P. 106. Service outside
the state would be made pursuant to Md. R. Civ. P. 107. While service of process is
prescribed by the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 6-102(a) governs only the state's assertion of jurisdictional authority over Maryland
corporations.
52. According to Springle, § 6-102(a) authorizes service in the state.
53. The assertion of jurisdictional authority would rest on § 6-103(b)(4). Service in
the state would be made pursuant to Md. Rule 106, while service outside the state would
be made pursuant to Rule 107.
54. See notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text supra. The court's argument
overlooks the fact that the criteria for jurisdiction under § 6-103(b) over non-qualifying
corporations with less than "personal" service refer only to claims arising out of the
contacts enumerated.
55. See notes 28 and 29 and accompanying text supra.
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of confusion regarding the 1973 amendment. The provisions of § 6-
103(b) are being read into the "service of process" clause of § 6-102
without anything in the statute itself to so advise the unwary
practitioner. Furthermore, this reading is being applied only to
corporations and not to individuals (who are subject to jurisdiction on
the basis of service of process in the state without reference to the
§ 6-103(b) criteria), despite the fact that the same provision in
§ 6-103(a) applies to both.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SHAFFER v. HEITNER
Shaffer v. Heitner5 6 was decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1977. It is one of the most important decisions in the area of
judicial jurisdiction in recent years and has a potentially strong impact
on the subject of general jurisdiction. Shaffer could not have been cited
in Geelhoed, of course, because Geelhoed was decided in 1976. The
Springle case, however, was decided a year after Shaffer, yet the court
makes no reference to it.
The Shaffer case involved the assertion of jurisdiction in connection
with a claim unrelated to the forum state on the basis of the presence of
the defendant's property in the state. Since Pennoyer v. Neff,5 7 this
method often has been employed to obtain jurisdiction, the only
limitation being that the amount of the judgment is limited by the value
of the property. This is the traditional quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 58
Shaffer involved a claim against non-resident officers and members
of the board of directors of a Delaware corporation for violating their
duties to the corporation by acts, outside the forum state of Delaware,
that resulted in corporate liability in a private antitrust suit. The state
used sequestered shares of the stock in the corporation owned by the
defendants as the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court held that the presence of property in the forum state is not, by
itself, sufficient to assert jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to the
forum. There must be a sufficient relationship between the forum, the
defendant, and the litigation for proper jurisdiction to exist.59 This
56. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
57. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
58. See RESTATEMENT at §§ 66-68.
59. After tracing the development of the law from Pennoyer to International Shoe, the
Court summarized as follows: "Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which
the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal
jurisdiction." 433 U.S. at 204. The Court, in its discussion of the presence of property in a
state as a basis for jurisdiction, emphasized the need for "contacts among the forum State,
the defendant, and the litigation." Id. at 207.
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standard is applicable to all assertions of jurisdiction, however tech-
nically denominated.
A. Shaffer's Impact on In Personam General Jurisdiction
1. In General
To what extent does the Shaffer emphasis on a forum-defendant-
litigation nexus apply to assertions of general jurisdiction over the
person? In such cases, the forum-litigation element of the nexus is
necessarily absent. The Shaffer case indicated two situations where
jurisdiction might exist validly in the absence of this element. One
situation is where no other forum is available. 60 This condition would be
rare. The second circumstance arises in cases involving a question of
status,61 such as divorce. The status exception, however, is not relevant
to this analysis.
Even on the basis of the Shaffer case, it is probably going too far to
contend that, except for these two situations, all general jurisdiction has
been invalidated. The specific context of the Court's discussion is the
quasi-in-rem situation where jurisdiction is asserted solely on the basis
of defendant's property in the state, and not on personal jurisdiction.
The opinion in Shaffer stated that the jurisdictional doctrines set forth
in International Shoe and its progeny are applicable "to all assertions of
state court jurisdiction."62 It is speculative, however, what effect these
doctrines have on assertions of general jurisdiction in which the
connecting factor is one that links the defendant with the state - e.g.,
an individual being served with process or domiciled in the state, a
corporation being organized in the state, or a non-resident or foreign
corporation being engaged in some continuing activity in the state. At
the very least, a heavy burden of persuasion rests on those who would
argue for the validity of any particular exercise of general jurisdiction to
overcome the absence of the forum-litigation element of the three-way
nexus required by Shaffer.
Shaffer held that state court jurisdiction, however denominated, must
comply with the standards of "International Shoe and its progeny;"
63
therefore a review of the facts in International Shoe Co. v. Washington6 is
necessary. In that case, the defendant foreign corporation's activity in the
state was the continuous and systematic solicitation of purchase orders. The
60. Id. at 211 n.37.
61. Id. at 208 n.30.
62. Id. at 212.
63. Id.
64. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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claim sued upon arose out of those activities - a case of specificjurisdiction
as it was a related claim. The Court held that, under such circumstances,
"fair play and substantial justice" permitted the assertion ofjurisdiction -
the forum state had a sufficient interest in the matter, and the defendant
had conducted itself in such a way as to make it fair and convenient that it
should defend itself on that claim in that forum. The defendant's activities
had created a reasonable expectation of possible suits, and it should not have
been surprised by the choice of forum.
Can these standards be satisfied when the claim sued upon is an
unrelated claim and when the forum state has no direct interest in the claim
itself, based upon the argument that there is a sufficient nexus between the
forum state and the defendant? The answer may depend on the quality and
strength of the link between the two.
2. Service of Process in the State
There is a general consensus of opinion among the commentators that
the Shaffer doctrines have invalidated jurisdiction based solely upon
service of process on an individual in the state.6" The common law rule
which allowed jurisdiction based on an individual's physical presence in the
state at the moment process is served fails to satisfy the requirement of a
state interest in the case, as well as the requirements of fairness and
convenience to the defendant. Furthermore, there is no reasonable
expectation of being sued in the particular forum. The fact of the defendant's
presence in the state should provide no greater justification forjurisdiction
over a claim unrelated to the state than the presence of his property in the
state. If this view is correct, the provision of § 6-102 which asserts such
jurisdiction must be considered invalid.
3. Domicile
Domicile of an individual in a state is undoubtedly a stronger link than
transient physical presence. Milliken v. Meyer 66 established domicile as a
valid basis forjurisdiction, and emphasized the permanent reciprocal rights
and duties between the domiciliary and his state, a relationship which
65. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 43 (3d ed. 1977); Vernon, supra note 2, at
302-03; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 134-35; Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe:
Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.
565, 567 (1979); Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of
In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979). Some cases since Shaffer also take
the position that jurisdiction based on presence alone is no longer valid. See, e.g.,
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1088-89 (D. Kan. 1978); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978).
66. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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exists even when the individual is temporarily absent. Milliken, however,
was decided before International Shoe. Applying the International Shoe
standards, it is at least debatable whether the forum state has a sufficient
interest in a case which does not concern it directly, merely on the basis of
the defendant's domicile. There is an element of convenience to the
defendant in litigating the case in his home state, and he should perhaps
anticipate being sued there. There is also an element ofjustice arguably due
a plaintiff in providing him with a certain and predictable place where he
can make a claim against a defendant. Yet, when an individual is sued at his
residence a thousand miles away from the place where an accident occurred,
one can reasonably argue against the appropriateness of the case being
tried at the place of residence. Under Shaffer, it is no longer a question of
forum non conveniens, but of proper jurisdiction. Thus, the continued
validity of the domicile provision in § 6-102 is at least arguable. 67
4. Incorporation in the State
The closest equivalent to domicile in the case of a corporation is its
organization under the laws of a state. The act of incorporation in a
state creates an ongoing relationship with that state, and it is this
relationship which is the rationale for the provision of § 6-102 asserting
jurisdiction on this basis. However, just as for domicile of an individual,
the Shaffer case has raised at least some doubt as to the validity of
incorporation as a basis for jurisdiction.
5. Continuing and Substantial Activity in the State
Service on an agent of a corporation while in the state is no
different, in and of itself, than service on an individual. However, the
fact that a foreign corporation has a resident agent in the state indicates
that it is engaging in some activity there. If there is to be valid general
jurisdiction over the corporation, it would have to be based on these
activities. But, after Shaffer, general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation is questionable, even when it rests upon continuing and
substantial activity in the state.
On the one hand, Shaffer may be read as saying that even a close
and substantial relationship of a defendant to a state is not sufficient for
jurisdiction over a claim in which the state has no interest. The nexus
between the state and the litigation is absent, and the jurisdictional
67. See Werner, supra note 64, at 596; Developments in the Law: State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 941-43 (1960). See also Vernon, supra note 2, at
299-301. Weintraub concludes that Shaffer "may bar the use of technical domicile alone
as a basis for jurisdiction." R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 135.
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focus is no longer on the parties alone but also on the case. This is not to
say, however, that the court is abandoning the Hanson v. Denckla6 8
emphasis on the defendant's purposeful contact with the forum state.
What is required is that the purposeful contact be within the context of
the particular dispute.
A contrary argument would rely first on Shaffer's invocation of
International Shoe and its progeny. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.,69 an offspring of International Shoe, upheld general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on continuous and systema-
tic activity in the state. Where the defendant has a very substantial
relationship to the forum, sufficient interest of the forum in the
litigation, although indirect, could be said to exist. It is not inconvenient
for the defendant to litigate there and the choice of forum is not
completely unexpected.
B. The Supreme Court's Trend vs. The Maryland Trend
Whatever the outcome of the specific questions posed, it is clear
that the Supreme Court has begun a process of restriction on the
exercise of general jurisdiction. Developments in Maryland, by legisla-
tion and decision, exhibit the contrary trend of expansion in the exercise
of general jurisdiction. By legislation in 1971, the more inclusive
standards for linking the defendant with the state for purposes of
specific jurisdiction over tortious injury cases (injury in the state) were
made applicable to general jurisdiction (injury outside the state).7° By
decision in 1978, the same standards were to be used for general
jurisdiction over all claims against a foreign corporation so long as an
agent was served in the state."' The objective of a long-arm statute is to
delineate the permissible bases for jurisdiction. To the extent that the
constitutional parameters are exceeded, the statute fails to achieve its
purpose.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated the future
direction which the law of judicial jurisdiction will take. The focus will
be on the relationship of the forum state to both the parties and the
dispute. Perhaps it is only in the exceptional situation that a state will
68. 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see text at notes 21 and 22 supra.
69. 342 U.S. 437, reh. denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952). See notes 13 and 14 and
accompanying text supra..
70. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
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be able to provide a forum on the basis of general jurisdiction where the
link to the dispute is absent. Maryland law with its expanding use of
general jurisdiction needs to be re-thought and made consistent with
this constitutional trend.
At the same time, attention should be given to the confusing
pattern of the current statute. Both §§ 6-102 and 6-103 now contain
provisions covering general jurisdiction. The standards in each are
different and, in some cases, overlapping. The standard in § 6-102 is
"principal place of business" and applies to all cases. The standard in
§ 6-103(b)(4) is ordinary types of activity, and applies to tortious injury.
This also applies to jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in all of the
cases where service is made on a resident agent. The standard of
§ 6-102, however, applies if service is made by registered mail to the
home office of the corporation.
The statutory problem could be eliminated by the adoption of an
approach similar to that taken by the California legislature. The
California statute reads: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction
on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of
the United States. ' 2 In each case, only the problem of the constitu-
tionality of the jurisdiction would have to be decided.
If this approach were adopted in Maryland, the repeated statements
of the courts that the Maryland statutep makes judicial jurisdiction
coextensive with the limits permitted by the due process decisions of the
Supreme Court 3 would finally become accurate. An advantage to the
legislator in enacting this type of statute is that he need not be
prescient regarding future Supreme Court decisions. There has been
enough experience since International Shoe to make the constitutional
standard sufficiently precise to resolve the question. Even if the
itemization of jurisdictional assertions is retained for specific jurisdic-
tion, the constitutional standard could be made the sole criterion for
general jurisdiction.
72. CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE § 410.10 (West).
73. Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. at 224, 382 A.2d 818, 821 (1976); Krashers v. White,
275 Md. 549, 558, 341 A.2d 798, 803 (1975); Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md.
126, 130, 277 A.2d 272, 275 (1971); Harris v. Arlen Properties, Inc., 256 Md, 185, 260 A.2d
22, 27, 195 (1969); Gilliam v. Moog Industries, 239 Md. 107, 111, 210 A.2d 390, 392 (1965).
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